University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 5

Article 6

5-1-2022

How President Biden Can Fill the Central District of California
Bench
Carl Tobias
University of Richmond School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, How President Biden Can Fill the Central District of California Bench, 56 U. Rich. L. Rev. 113
(2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss5/6

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

HOW PRESIDENT BIDEN CAN FILL THE CENTRAL
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BENCH
Carl Tobias *
President Joseph Biden confronts an enormous opportunity to
seat highly qualified, mainstream federal judges in plenty of appeals court and district court openings which former President
Donald Trump neglected to fill in his four-year term. The remarkable California trial level vacant emergency slots, particularly in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California, are the United States’ worst-case scenario and consummate
promise. The Central District of California tribunal had experienced as many as ten lengthy open court slots among twenty-eight
posts, but it encounters six today.
Trump incessantly boasted that confirming appellate court jurists comprised his administration’s most outstanding success. The
Republican President and Grand Old Party (“GOP”) Senate majorities in the 115th and the 116th Congress dramatically eclipsed
records by confirming fifty-four accomplished, extremely conservative, and particularly young circuit judges.1 Nevertheless, these
court of appeals confirmations actually inflicted substantial complications, especially affecting the plentiful district courts which
faced approximately 150 vacancies regarding 677 positions.
* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Margaret Sanner, Katie Lehnen, Jane Baber, Carley Ruival, and Jamie Wood for valuable suggestions, the University of Richmond Law Library staff for valuable research assistance,
Leslee Stone and Ashley Griffin for excellent processing, University of Richmond Law Review Online Editor Tesia Kempski for expeditious, careful, and flexible editing and for her
sound advice and patience, as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Andrews Kurth
Summer Endowment Research Fund for generous, continuing support. I assume complete
responsibility for any errors that remain in this piece.
1. Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Has
Delivered Record Breaking Results for the American People in His First Three Years in
Office (Dec. 31, 2019); Carl Hulse, With Wilson Confirmation, Trump and Senate Republicans Achieve a Milestone, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/
us/trump-senate-judges-wilson.html [https://perma.cc/65HY-FZFH]; Micah Schwartzman &
David Fontana, Trump Picked the Youngest Judges to Sit on the Federal Bench. Your Move,
Biden., WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/16/
court-appointments-age-biden-trump-judges-age [https://perma.cc/7W59-W4TB].
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The Central District is a quintessential example. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AO”) recognizes that
the court’s open slots are “judicial emergencies,” because most of
the posts have been vacant for seriously protracted times or have
involved significant caseloads. Indeed, this situation concomitantly obtains for the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of
California, which address an overwhelming fifteen emergency vacancies, comprising nearly half of the emergencies in the entire
United States. Despite these pressing circumstances, former President Trump eschewed nominations altogether for the Central District throughout his first twenty months, waited another prolonged
year before naming candidates for more openings, rejected affording a single choice for other positions, and failed to confirm one
jurist ahead of September 2020. Both of the GOP upper chamber
majorities actually left unclear precisely when nominees whom the
Judiciary Committee had denied hearings would receive the sessions and exactly when the Senate would convene floor debates and
confirmation votes for those nominees whom the committee had
approved. The “crisis of unprecedented magnitude” became so
acute that prior Chief Judge Virginia Phillips “implore[d] the Senate to act on the nominations [mustered], the President to nominate candidates [for the remaining] vacancies, and the Senate” to
expeditiously confirm preeminent individuals for all of the Central
District openings.2
The Central District has a virulent strain of the vacancies epidemic which wreaks havoc around the whole country. The Central
District jurists are plainly the trial level justice system’s “workhorses,” because they must resolve gargantuan civil and criminal
dockets. The openings impose tremendous pressure on this court’s
judges, litigants, counsel, and court personnel. Accordingly, how
Biden, Trump’s highly experienced replacement, and the California senators—Democrats Dianne Feinstein, the former Judiciary
Committee Ranking Member, and newly-chosen Senator Alex Padilla—could expeditiously fill all six of the present Central District
vacancies merits analysis.

2. Letter from Central District of California Chief Judge Virginia Phillips to White
House Counsel Patrick Cipollone, Senators Dianne Feinstein, Lindsey Graham, & Kamala
Harris (Oct. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Phillips Letter]; see Letter from Eastern District of California Chief Judge Lawrence O’Neill to White House Counsel Cipollone and Senators Feinstein and Harris (Oct. 18, 2019) (making a similarly substantial, and perhaps more compelling, case for the Eastern District of California).
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The piece initially canvasses the history of judicial appointments. Section two chronicles the practices which President Trump
and the Republican Senate majorities deployed, perceiving that the
President and the chambers concentrated on exceptionally rapid
approval of conservative, young appellate court jurists yet failed to
emphasize filling trial court openings. Former President Trump
also ignored, deleted, or narrowed valuable traditions, including
robust consultation of senators from jurisdictions which experience
a plethora of vacancies. The segment then assesses confirmation
strictures employed by the pair of GOP Senate majorities, detecting that the panels and the chambers jettisoned and restricted major venerable norms, while they seemingly disregarded rigorous,
equitable procedures that had previously applied to committee
hearings and chamber floor debates. However, meaningful Trump
Administration consultation of Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris (then-senator and current Vice President), who appeared to robustly collaborate with the White House, supported the comparatively efficacious nomination regime, although substantially
delayed confirmation system, accorded the initial three Central
District nominees and prominent, moderate nominees whom the
chief executive marshaled around 2019’s close.
Section three reviews the implications of multiple Republican
White House and Senate appointments practices, finding that the
Central District ultimately endured up to nine more openings than
at President Trump’s 2017 inauguration. Judge Phillips recounted
striking empirical data which trenchantly demonstrate the problems. For instance, the district court’s active jurists serve “19 million people;” each jurist navigates and resolves a “case load of [almost 1,000] civil” matters.3
The fourth segment proffers numerous recommendations. Now
that President Biden has deftly recalibrated Trump’s selection processes and Democrats command a razor-thin Senate majority, because a significant number of Central District vacancies remain
open, Biden must assiduously consult Senators Feinstein and Padilla while cooperating with all of their colleagues and revitalizing
salutary concepts on which earlier Presidents and Senates have
capitalized and place talented, mainstream, diverse judges in the
3. This particular statistic is “nearly double the national average.” Phillips Letter, supra note 2. The Southern District of California’s five vacancies could suggest that the tribunal’s circumstances may be worse; however, the Central District of California openings are
larger and most of the vacancies are more protracted. See infra notes 84, 89 and accompanying text.
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six vacancies. The Democratic chamber majority ought to adopt
constructive, proven devices, notably rigorous Judiciary Committee hearings and panel deliberations and robust chamber floor debates. These measures should productively eliminate or reduce the
six existing Central District openings.
I. CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SELECTION DIFFICULTIES
The applicable history warrants comparatively limited analysis
in this piece, because a number of writers have considered the relevant background, and the current difficulties have enhanced relevance.4 One significant attribute is the permanent vacancies dilemma, which results from enlarged federal court jurisdiction,
dockets, and court slots. Another, the modern conundrum, is political and emanates from conflicting Senate and presidential control
which began forty years ago.
A. Persistent Vacancies
Congress dramatically increased federal court jurisdiction after
the 1950s,5 expanding civil suits and federalizing more criminal
activity, parameters which intrinsically drove cases.6 Legislators
addressed rising dockets by creating seats.7 Over the fifteen years
before 1995, appointments times mounted.8 For example, circuit
nominations required twelve, and confirmations devoured three,
months.9
The nomination and confirmation processes’ large numbers of
steps and substantial quantity of participants mean that delay

4. Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial Vacancies: Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 319 (1994);
WHITE BURKETT MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT].
5. MILLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Federal Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268–70 (1996).
6. E.g., Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994).
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133; ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2022) [hereinafter JUDICIAL VACANCIES].
8. Bermant et al., supra note 4, at 323, 329–32.
9. Id. Nominations consumed twenty months and confirmations devoured six in the
first year of President Bill Clinton’s second term and of President George W. Bush’s first
term. Those years resembled President Barack Obama’s first year and last two. Carl Tobias,
Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 887 (2018).
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comprises an inherent phenomenon.10 Chief executives actively
consult home state elected officials, pursuing instructive guidance
on candidates, and senators tender preeminent submissions. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) provides extensive “background checks.” The American Bar Association (“ABA”) comprehensively examines and rates choices.11 The Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) thoroughly screens individuals and readies nominees for
chamber assessments. The Judiciary Committee analyzes picks,
schedules hearings, discusses candidates, and votes; those whom
the panel reports might receive floor debates, when necessary, preceding final ballots.
B. The Modern Dilemma
The Constitution envisions that senators will halt misguided
White House nominations, yet partisanship has sporadically
plagued selection.12 Politicization intensively soared when President Richard Nixon declared that he would muster “law and order”
by tapping “strict constructionists,”13 and especially previous to
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court vote.14 Partisanship spiked,
while divided government and the idea that the party not controlling the executive would recapture the presidency and confirm jurists animated dilatory conduct. Moreover, slow nominations and
confirmations explain the few appointments.15
In Barack Obama’s presidency, Republican senators ended collaboration, displayed by the unprecedented refusal to assess D.C.
Circuit Chief Judge Merrick Garland, Obama’s distinguished

10. Bermant et al., supra note 4; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal Judiciary:
Great Expectations but Will He Have a Dickens of a Time Living Up to Them?, FORUM, Apr.
9, 2009.
11. ABA, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS (1983); see infra notes 27–28, 30, 57.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); see
MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000). See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES:
LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
13. GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 205; DAVID O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION (1988).
14. E.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDERS ACCOUNT OF
AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992);
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (2007).
15. 1997 and 2001 selection exemplify this. Tobias, supra note 9, at 888–89 (analyzing
Clinton and Bush judicial selection).
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United States Supreme Court nominee.16 After reassuming a
chamber majority during November 2014, the GOP vowed to again
implement “regular order,” which Democrats had putatively
eroded once they had captured the majority in 2007. However, Republicans approved only twenty Obama nominees his last pair of
years, the fewest since President Harry Truman; these elements
meant that the country encountered 103 appellate court and district court openings upon Trump’s inauguration and the Central
District experienced five; one vacancy was an emergency.17
II. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION
A. Nomination Process
In the 2016 presidential election campaign, Trump pledged to
evaluate and seat ideological conservatives. He effectuated the
promises by appointing three Justices—Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—and manifold similar circuit
jurists, although Trump confirmed relatively few analogous district court nominees at first.18 He broke circuit records for a President’s initial two years.19
The former President depended on some respected customs but
violated or downplayed other traditions. For instance, he, like
every modern President, assigned numerous responsibilities to the
White House Counsel (Donald McGahn), related duties to the Department of Justice and crucial responsibility for district vacancies
to in state politicians.20 Trump emphasized appeals courts; when
16. See, e.g., Robin Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair, What History and the
Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2016); see also Carl Tobias, Confirming Supreme
Court Justices in a Presidential Election Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089 (2017).
17. California confronted four Ninth Circuit emergencies and one more district vacancy.
JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations, Emergencies (2015–2017)); 163 CONG.
REC. S8,022-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Durbin, Feinstein, & Leahy);
see Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and Regular Order, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 12
(2016) (defining regular order which the Republican Senate majority vowed to, but did not,
restore).
18. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2017–2020)).
19. Trump confirmed twelve circuit judges in 2017, eighteen in 2018, twenty in 2019
and four in 2020. Id.
20. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2233, 2240 (2013); Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, McGahn, Solider for Trump
and Witness Against Him, Leaves White House, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/politics/don-mcgahn-leaves-trump-administration.html [https://
perma.cc/89WW-FP3N] (documenting that McGahn’s tenure ended in October 2018 and
Patrick Cipollone was Counsel over the remainder of Trump’s tenure).
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approaching those, he focused on conservatism while applying the
“short list” of potential Supreme Court prospects whom the Federalist Society assembled.21 These notions continued governing
White House judicial selection, because Leonard Leo, the Federalist Society’s Executive Vice President,22 helped Trump stress circuits, which are tribunals of last resort for myriad cases, articulate
broader policy than district courts, and issue rulings that cover a
few states.23
However, Trump defied or altered valuable traditions. One was
consulting politicians about home state openings, a convention
that all Presidents employ. In Obama’s tenure, consultation enjoyed salient priority through the systematic deployment use of
“blue slips,” which permitted no hearing unless both senators from
jurisdictions returned them. Democrats alleged that McGahn negligibly consulted on appellate vacancies, while the White House
Counsel replied that the Constitution omits the idea.24 Most pertinently, Senators Feinstein and Harris contended that Trump
failed to “adequately consult” about submissions—Daniel Bress,
Patrick Bumatay, Daniel Collins, and Kenneth Lee—for openings
at the Ninth Circuit which are allocated to California.25 Yet, when

21. Donald McGahn, A Brief History of Judicial Appointments, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV.
ONLINE 105 (2019); Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.html [https://perma.cc/GD5J-JWCG] (Mar. 16,
2020); Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appealscourts-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/JT7K-Z98E].
22. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Shawn Boburg, A Conservative Activist’s Behind-the-Scenes
Campaign to Remake the Nation’s Courts, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/leonard-leo-federalists-society-courts [https://
perma.cc/QZN5-3849]; Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative
Group Is Reshaping the Courts Under Trump, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:06 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/after-eight-years-on-the-sidelines-this-co
nservative-group [https://perma.cc/7N2G-N2LP]; see Madison Alder, Leonard Leo to Keep
Judicial Advocacy Focus in New Venture, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/us-law-week/XG8GCB4000000 [https://perma.
cc/45YH-KHVC].
23. Goldman, supra note 12; Tobias, supra note 20, at 2240–41; 163 CONG. REC. S8,02224 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
24. Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/VF5P-HSEW]; Zoe Tillman, Here’s How Trump Is Trying to Remake His
Least Favorite Court, BUZZFEED NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/
heres-who-the-white-house-pitched-for-the-federal-appeals [https://perma.cc/CZ2H-43M3]
(Mar. 16, 2018, 9:06 AM).
25. Carl Tobias, Filling the California Ninth Circuit Vacancies, 92 S. CAL. L. REV.
POSTSCRIPT 83, 91–95 (2019); Press Release, Harris on Nomination of Patrick Bumatay to
the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 30, 2019); see infra note 48 (analyzing Bumatay’s confirmation
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suggesting three able, rather mainstream Central District nominees over 2018 and five other prominent, consensus aspirants
later, Counsel seemed to attentively consult the politicians, who
adeptly relied on several bipartisan merit vetting commissions
that aptly improved coordination.26
Another critical deviation from revered precedents was exclusion of the American Bar Association from selection initiatives.
Presidents after Dwight Eisenhower, save George W. Bush, consistently invoked ABA examinations and ratings in denominating
candidates. Obama refused to forward any possibility whom the
bar committee deemed not qualified.27 Trump submitted ten
around the country with this ranking, but eight won appointment,
while the ABA found most California applicants well qualified yet
carefully declined to rate anyone not qualified.28
Trump deployed many vaunted procedures when sending trial
level nominees to the chamber. For instance, like recent Presidents, he extracted assistance from home state officers while premising most nominations on competence to address substantial dockets, which California showed.29 Many aspirants nationwide were

process and senators’ objections to him); Tobias, supra note 9, at 898 (documenting similar
treatment of other Democratic senators from states with appellate vacancies); Maura Dolan,
Trump Has Flipped the 9th Circuit—and Some New Judges Are Causing a ‘Shock Wave’,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020, 7:06 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0222/trump-conservative-judges-9th-circuit [https://perma.cc/4LVG-4YFU] (analyzing Trump
California appointees’ effects on the circuit).
26. Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar. 13,
2019) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
27. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/politics/white-house-ameri
can-bar-association-judges.html [https://perma.cc/WFF7-22SP]; Charlie Savage, Biden
Won’t Restore ABA Vetting Role, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/02/05/us/politics/biden-american-bar-association-judges.html [https://perma.cc/23QZ4H2S]; 163 CONG. REC. S8,022-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Durbin,
Feinstein, & Leahy) (touting American Bar Association input and Obama refusal to nominate not qualified picks); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. (Oct. 30, 2019) (Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) criticizing ABA and urging that its input cease).
28. Ratings of Article III and Article IV Judicial Nominees, ABA, https://www.am
ericanbar.org/groups/committees/federal_judiciary/ratings [https://perma.cc/3KF5-DTER]
(providing the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary’s ratings for the 115th,
116th, and 117th Congresses (2017–2022)); Ann E. Marimow & Matt Viser, Biden Moves to
Make Mark on Federal Courts After Trump’s Record Judicial Nominations, WASH. POST
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/biden-judge-nomination
s/2021/02/02/e9932f3a-6189-11eb-9430-e7c77b5b0297_story.html [https://perma.cc/6RN3-5
8MY] (Biden’s approach).
29. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump Administration,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 19 (2017). But see Seung Min Kim, Trump’s Judge Picks:
‘Not Qualified,’ Prolific Bloggers, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017, 5:05 AM), https://www.politi
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preeminent candidates who had fine ABA rankings,30 although
multiple choices withdrew and Trump urged GOP senators to oppose nominees who lacked capability.31
Trump ignored or deemphasized efficacious mechanisms. A predicament with trial level selection was not prioritizing the 150 vacancies in the rush to appoint manifold extremely conservative,
young appellate court jurists.32 Trump confirmed fewer judges in
jurisdictions which Democrats represent, even though the states
face immense emergencies, notably six across the Central District.33 Trump refused to designate anyone for this court’s ten open
posts and three unfilled circuit slots arising in California previous
to October 2018 or to approve a circuit jurist ahead of May in the
following year; he recommended no one for five other Central District vacancies within a year or for two more later and realized district court appointments only upon 2020’s end.34
In October 2018, Trump had suggested Bumatay, Collins, and
Lee for Ninth Circuit open emergency positions and Stanley Blumenfeld, Jeremy Rosen, plus Mark Scarsi for Central District vacancies, and in early February 2019, he renominated Collins and
Lee, offered Daniel Bress for the Ninth Circuit, resubmitted all
three Central District picks, and renamed Bumatay to the Southern District.35 In that mid-October, Trump resent Bumatay for the
Ninth Circuit plus designated Fernando Aenlle-Rocha, Sandy
Nunes Leal, and Rick Richmond for the Central District openings
co.com/story/2017/10/17/trump-judges-nominees-court-picks-243834 [https://perma.cc/HY5
5-5F59].
30. District Judges Walter Counts and Karen Gren Scholer are exceptional illustrations. See supra notes 28–29
31. Tobias, supra note 9, at 894; Tom McCarthy, Judge Not: Five Judicial Nominees
Trump Withdrew—and Four Pending, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019, 3:00 EDT), https://www.
theguardian.com/law/2019/mar/10/judge-not-five-judicial-nominees-trump-withdrew-and-f
our-pending [https://perma.cc/E7VL-GPCD].
32. Emergencies soared from twelve to as many as eighty-six after the GOP assumed a
Senate majority in January 2015. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Emergencies (2015–
2022)).
33. California experienced vacancies in up to four appellate, and seventeen (now sixteen) district, court posts. Id.
34. Data demonstrate that Republicans elevated “red” over “blue” state priority. Russell
Wheeler, Judicial Appointments in Trump’s First Three Years: Myths and Realities,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28/judicial- appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/ [https://perma.cc/UM8V-U6
PB] (“The Senate moved nominees in states with two GOP senators to confirmation in 217
median days. It took 412 days for nominees in two-Democratic-senator states.”).
35. Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Twelve Nominations Sent to
the Senate (Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Feb. 6, 2019 Press Release] (naming Bress and renaming other two nominees to Ninth Circuit and Bumatay to Southern District).
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with Adam Braverman plus Shireen Matthews for empty posts regarding the Southern District.36 Later this fall, the President chose
John Holcomb and Steve Kim for Central District vacancies, and
Knut Johnson, Michelle Pettit, and Todd Robinson for Southern
District openings.37
In 2019’s end, the committee furnished Aenlle-Rocha, Blumenfeld, plus Scarsi hearings, but the chamber did not vote on the prospects until autumn 2020.38 When Congress’ first session adjourned, the Senate members directly returned the thirteen
California nominees to the White House; in January 2020, Trump
dutifully reproposed the three nominees with hearings, yet delayed
resubmitting ten more nominees before February 13 plus suggesting two Eastern District nominees until late May and June; therefore, nine waited on hearings that the Republican Party failed to
set.39
A custom which Trump ignored or diluted was enlarging minority representation.40 He instituted little action to pinpoint, canvass, nominate, and confirm accomplished, consensus ethnic minority, or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
(“LGBTQ”), candidates by, for instance, employing diverse appointments staff or requesting that lawmakers proffer numbers of

36. Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Eighteen Nominations Sent to
the Senate (Oct. 17, 2019) (renaming Bumatay to the Ninth Circuit and naming five district
picks).
37. Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Nine Nominations Sent to the
Senate (Nov. 21, 2019) (nominating Holcomb, Kim, Johnson, Pettit, and Robinson).
38. Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Nov. 13,
2019); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4,
2019); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar.
5, 2020).
39. Senators held over none. 166 CONG. REC. S10 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2020); see Press
Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Seven Nominations Sent to Senate (Jan. 9,
2020) (renaming three); Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Eleven Nominations Sent to Senate (Feb. 13, 2020) (renaming ten); Press Release, White House, Off. of
the Press Sec’y, Ten Nominations Sent to Senate (May 21, 2020) (naming Dirk Paloutzian
to the Eastern District); Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Eight Nominations Sent to the Senate (June 18, 2020) (same as to James Arguelles); Hearing on Nominees
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 17, 2020) (Holcomb, Matthews, &
Robinson hearing); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. (July 23, 2020) (approving three nominees); JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2020)) (confirming four Central and one Southern District judges).
40. See, e.g., Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 20 (2019); Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump’s War on Federal Judicial Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2019).
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minority selections 41 In 228 circuit court and district court appointees, two comprise LGBTQ judges; thirty-two are persons of color.42
In 260-plus aspirants nominated, only thirty-eight constitute ethnic minorities—seventeen Asian American, ten Black, one Jamaican, and ten Latinx, nominees.43 Of particular California submissions, over half are men; nonetheless, Bumatay, Lee, Kim, and
Matthews comprise Asian Americans, while Aenlle-Rocha plus
Leal constitute Latinx suggestions and Bumatay is gay.44
B. Confirmation Process
The confirmation process’ deleterious elements resembled those
of the nomination system in a few ways, primarily by eliminating
or modifying conventions that have long operated efficaciously. Illustrative were amending the century-old blue slip practice and
significantly changing hearing procedures. Over fall 2017, Chuck
Grassley (R-IA), as then-panel Chair, fashioned an exception for
individuals who lacked blue slips provided by two senators from
jurisdictions with court of appeals vacancies, especially when opposition was apparently “political or ideological.”45 He changed the
blue slip notion, to which each party had adhered during all eight
of Obama’s years—which comprised the most recent, salient precedent.46 This situation deteriorated when the Chair processed
nominees, although former President Trump had minimally consulted, as Grassley negligibly justified according the Chair (himself) responsibility to determine whether former President Trump
41. LGBTQ means openly divulged sexual orientation, which some may have not disclosed. LGBTQ individuals are considered “minorities” throughout this piece. See infra note
56.
42. Ninth Circuit Judge Bumatay and Northern District of Illinois Judge Mary Rowland are the only LGBTQ jurists whom Trump nominated or appointed. JUDICIAL
VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2017–2021)); see sources cited supra note 40.
43. Trump confirmed no Black to any U.S. circuit or California post. See sources cited
supra notes 35–42, infra note 94.
44. In the Central District, Aenlle-Rocha and Leal are Latinx, she is the only woman
and Kim is Asian American. Judges Lee and Bumatay are the only Trump Ninth Circuit
minority appointees. See sources cited supra notes 35–37.
45. 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); id. at S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
2017); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 29,
2017); see Carl Tobias, Senator Chuck Grassley and Judicial Confirmations, 104 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE 31 (2019) (assessing the role that Grassley played when he served as Chair
from 2015–2018).
46. Chairs Grassley and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) strictly followed the blue slip policy for
all lower court nominees throughout Obama’s tenure. Executive Business Meeting Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2018) (statements of Sens. Grassley &
Leahy); see Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. INTER ALIA (2018).
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“adequately consulted.”47 Grassley asserted that blue slips insure
that the executive branch meticulously consults politicians from
home states and protect the legislators’ judicial selection prerogatives, while he vowed to respect district court slips.48 Pertinent
were both of the California senators’ ardent rejection of nominees
Bress, Collins, and Lee,49 which Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC),
who became Chair in early 2019, labeled “ideological disputes.”50
The Republican majority was responsible for dilemmas encountered across the confirmation process, as the Grand Old Party
members changed effective hearing requirements and traditions.
One lengthy custom’s alteration was scheduling fifteen hearings for
two circuit, and often four trial court, nominees absent Democrats’
permission; this contrasted with three analogous hearings
throughout Obama’s eight years.51 Perhaps most relevant to California were single hearings about Collins and Lee plus Bumatay
and Lawrence VanDyke; none of the hearings occurred with the
47. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 46 (statements of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy);
see sources cited supra note 24 (Republicans honoring very few blue slips); Tobias, supra
note 46 (minimal precedent supports circuit exception).
48. See sources cited supra note 46. GOP senators did blue slip many accomplished,
centrist Obama circuit nominees for political or ideological reasons, the very bases Grassley
deemed illegitimate. See sources cited supra notes 17, 46.
49. Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar. 13,
2019) (Collins & Lee hearing); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (May 22, 2019) (Bress hearing); Executive Business Meeting Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Apr. 4, 2019) (Collins & Lee approval); Executive
Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 20, 2019) (Bress
approval); JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2019)). The senators opposed
all, whose nominations expired, so Grassley never publicly treated Trump’s consultation.
See sources cited supra note 25; 165 CONG. REC. S23 (daily ed. Jan 2, 2019). When Trump
did not rename them, yet sent fifty more, some politicians and members of the press criticized the White House Counsel’s cooperation with the California senators, urging swift renomination. Opinion, A Bad Judges Deal, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 29, 2019, 7:21 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-bad-judges-deal-11548807717 [https://perma.cc/7WAV-JL
Y6]. This helped name Bress and renominate Collins and Lee to the Ninth Circuit and
Bumatay to the Southern District; the senators opposed all three nominees. Press Release,
Feinstein, Harris on Ninth Circuit Nominees (Jan. 30, 2019); Feb. 6, 2019 Press Release,
supra note 35. When Bumatay was renamed to the circuit, the senators opposed this. Press
Release, Harris on Nomination of Bumatay, supra note 25; Feb. 6, 2019 Press Release, supra
note 35; Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Nov.
21, 2019) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). For Bumatay’s process, see Hearing, supra note 27;
Nov. 21 Executive Business Meeting, supra (confirmation).
50. He vowed to follow Grassley’s slip policies for circuit and district vacancies. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2019);
sources cited infra note 52; see sources cited supra note 49; Press Release, White House, Off.
of the Press Sec’y, Withdrawals Sent to the Senate (Sept. 19, 2019) (withdrawing nominee
lacking slip).
51. These were three special circumstances, and Democrats enjoyed Republican permission. E.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2174–76
(2011); 163 CONG. REC. S8,022-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

2022]

FILLING THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BENCH

125

Democratic minority’s consent.52 The GOP insisted on such tightly
packed hearings that senators had negligible time to ask queries;53
these sessions lacked care for evaluating people who may realize
life tenure.54 Some nominees dissembled by repeating or deflecting
questions and refusing to promise that they might dutifully recuse
when cases treat issues that nominees had litigated or on which
many hold distinctly extreme views.55 Illuminating were numerous
Trump appointees who have compiled exceedingly anti-LGBTQ
records.56
One clear departure from regular order was Grassley’s decision
to reject waiting for ABA input ahead of hearings or votes, despite
Feinstein’s myriad calls for ABA ratings before the sessions. He argued that the external “political group” should not dictate the
panel schedule.57 Thus, most controversial picks secured party-line
votes.58 Once nominees received approval, similar dynamics limited rigorous inquiry: the Democratic minority needed cloture and
roll call ballots for most nominees; both parties’ members deployed
lockstep voting; and exploding the “nuclear option” in 2013 meant
that nominees won confirmation on majority ballots.59 Other examples were ramming numbers of trial level jurists’ debates with
52. VanDyke was a controversial Ninth Circuit nominee for a Nevada vacancy. Hearing, supra note 26 (Collins & Lee hearing); Hearing, supra note 27 (Bumatay & VanDyke
hearing); see Carl Tobias, Keep the Federal Courts Great, 100 B.U. L. REV. 196, 214 & n.56
(2020) (Graham holding five more 2019 similar hearings).
53. See sources supra note 52; Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Apr. 25, 2019) (documenting the minority’s few resources).
54. See sources cited supra notes 24, 51–53; 163 CONG. REC. S8,022-24 (daily ed. Dec.
14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy) (criticizing Republicans’ lack of care).
55. Collins and Lee so acted, but Bress and Bumatay less so. Hearing, supra note 26;
hearings cited supra note 49; Hearing, supra note 27; Ross Todd, ABA ‘Not Qualified’ Rating
and Blue Slips Dominate Hearing for Ninth Circuit Nominees, RECORDER (Oct. 30, 2019,
1:32 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/10/30/aba-not-qualified-rating-blue-slipsdominate-hearing-for-ninth-circuit-nominees/?slreturn=20220207142212 [https://perma.cc/
4RFR-AM5X]; see Dolan, supra note 25 (Collins’ effect on the Ninth Circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 455
(recusal law).
56. LAMBDA LEGAL, COURTS, CONFIRMATIONS & CONSEQUENCES (2021); see Kristine
Phillips, Trump’s Judicial Appointees Will Impact LGBTQ Rights Far Beyond Presidency,
Group Says, USA TODAY (Jan. 5, 2021, 4:29 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2021/01/05/trump-judges-impact-lgbtq-rights-years-lambda-legal-says/4099483001
[https://perma.cc/XE75-8CJN].
57. Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Aug. 1,
2018) (statements of Sens. Grassley & Feinstein). The ABA only supplied input regarding
four New York nominees on the hearing date but sent it later for two more nominees. Id.
58. Tobias, supra note 9, at 901 n.103; see Executive Business Meeting, supra note 38
(smoothly approving Central District nominees).
59. Carl Tobias, Fill the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L. J. 121, 122 (2015). Cloture
and roll call votes do stop weak nominees; majority confirmation votes approve strong ones.
White House and Senate actions reflect who controls each.
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Senate votes into minimal time before recesses over July and December 2019; each canvass realized de minimis notice.60 The many
nominees and their substantial records duly restricted Democrats’
resources to prepare.61 Senate debates’ mixed quality resembled
that in committee deliberations.62
Republicans prioritized appellate court over district confirmations, non-emergencies, and openings in red states while confirming able, conservative white males.63 This dearth of attention was
not warranted. Trial court appointees can be, and frequently are,
the tribunal workhorses and resolve huge dockets. Emergencies
connote relatively pressing situations, and Trump’s constant political maneuvers and correspondingly senator party alignment
should not have driven core judicial resource distribution. Minority
jurists also provide numerous benefits.64 These concerns were magnified by the need to fill Justice Antonin Scalia’s Supreme Court
vacancy and the 103 lower court openings at Trump’s inauguration; Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the GOP leader, facilitated both.65

60. 165 CONG. REC. S5,228-30 (daily ed. July 31, 2019); id. at S7,135 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
2019); id. at S7,188-91 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2019); Schedule for Monday, July 29, 2019, U.S.
SENATE DEMOCRATS (July 25, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/
2019/07/25/schedule-for-monday-july-29-2019 [https://perma.cc/G95B-MX7E]; Schedule for
Thursday, December 19, 2019, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Dec. 18, 2019, 8:12 PM), https://
www.democrats.senate.gov/2019/12/18/schedule-for-thursday-december-19-2019 [https://pe
rma.cc/6GSP-DRFU].
61. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov.
2, 2017); sources cited supra note 53; see Tobias, supra note 9, at 902 (noting that Bush
never confirmed such a large number of circuit judges in his eight years as Trump did in
one week and that Obama did so only once).
62. See sources cited supra notes 51–55. The Republican Senate seemed to find the
thirty hours of post-cloture debate time for district nominees so unhelpful that the GOP
sharply decreased them to two. 165 CONG. REC. S2,220 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2019).
63. These priorities reflect the nominating regime. See sources cited supra notes 18–28,
32–44. White men are two of four California Ninth Circuit confirmees, and they were ten of
fifteen district nominees.
64. See supra notes 40–44, infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
65. Charles Homans, Mitch McConnell Got Everything He Wanted. But at What
Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/magazine/
mcconnell-senate-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/5JYN-B4FK]; Carl
Hulse, McConnell Has a Request for Veteran Federal Judges: Please Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/us/politics/mcconnell-judges-republicans.
html?searchResultPosition=5 [https://perma.cc/8MP5-FWDR]; Jane Mayer, How Mitch
McConnell Became Trump’s Enabler-in-Chief, NEW YORKER (Apr. 12, 2020), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/20/how-mitch-mcconnell-became-trumps-enabler-i
n-chief [https://perma.cc/U5LD-67TZ]; see Jane Mayer, Why McConnell Dumped Trump,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/01/whymcconnell-dumped-trump [https://perma.cc/J8Q4-P5RD]; infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (COVID-19).
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Those priorities enabled President Trump to secure the appellate court record his initial years. However, they left twenty-plus
district nominees absent confirmation; rampant vacancies at
2017’s conclusion and more upon the next two years’ close; emergencies profoundly imploded; and chronically few blue state or minority appointments.66 Central District open posts skyrocketed
from five to ten; emergencies profoundly rose from one to ten.67
Trump failed to approve a single prospect in the Central District
before September of his last year, one 2018 possibility never received a hearing, and merely five in one dozen California nominees
earned hearings over his final two years.
In the end, the makeup of California nominee packages showed
ample reasons for Trump’s dilatory proposal of most trial court
nominees and why so many picks elicited lacked hearings. His
White House seemingly proffered four California lawyers and
seated them in Ninth Circuit empty positions, and the California
senators apparently recommended most district prospects.68 In
short, Republicans quickly exacted several circuit judges’ appointment from purported “trades” but seemed to delay, or renege on,
confirming district picks.69
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT
The selection process’s assessment reveals that crucial notions
which Trump and the two Republican Senate majorities implemented manifested numerous detrimental ramifications. These
procedures left ten Central District vacancies that were all emergencies.70 California realized seventeen trial level openings that

66. For 2017, see sources cited supra notes 32–44, 62–64; JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra
note 7 (Confirmations, Emergencies (2017)). For 2018 and 2019, see JUDICIAL VACANCIES,
supra note 7 (Confirmations, Emergencies (2018–2019)).
67. Trump selected eight Central District nominees, four of whom received hearings,
and four California district nominees of color, two of whom earned hearings. See sources
cited supra notes 34–37, 39, 42, 44, 66.
68. The California senators’ retention of slips on four Trump California Ninth Circuit
nominees and return of slips for most district picks suggest that he chose the former and
the senators sent most district nominees. See infra notes 114–16.
69. For trades and “bipartisan” courts, see infra notes 101–12, 116–19. Trump also
seemingly taunted the California senators by slowly renaming nominees on whom he and
they had agreed. See sources cited supra notes 25, 34–37, 44, 66.
70. Most of the seventy-three district openings (thirty-two comprise emergencies) are
in jurisdictions that Democrats represent and few Trump confirmees are diverse, as California acutely demonstrates. See sources cited supra notes 32–44.

128

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 56:113

implicated pressing emergencies until late 2020,71 and now has
fourteen, which certainly have impaired endeavors of district jurists, litigants, and counsel to promptly, inexpensively, and fairly
treat rising cases.72 Those judges decide abundant civil and criminal lawsuits, the second of which receives precedence under the
Speedy Trial Act; the Central District addresses robust civil actions that comprise practically twice the United States average.73
Some parameters—six Central District emergency vacancies
and very few minority confirmees—indicate the necessity to appoint jurists who offer more comprehensive representation. No
Black was among twenty California appeals or trial court possibilities whom Trump sent. However, three of eight advanced in the
Central District are minorities, yet the chamber approved merely
one. Persons of color now encounter great representation as defendants in the criminal justice system and lack judicial representation. Central District residents have perennially been quite diverse, which suggests that minority bench representation
warrants significant expansion. Diversity furnishes advantages.74
People of color, women, and LGBTQ jurists offer trenchant views
on complex questions regarding abortion, criminal law, and other
daunting issues that federal courts resolve.75 Diverse judges restrict ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation biases which undercut
justice’s delivery.76 Jurists who reflect the United States distinctly
increase public respect for the courts by showing that ample persons of color, women, and LGBTQ designees can serve efficaciously
71. Emergencies, which were thirty-three in the U.S. and one in the Central District at
Trump’s ascension, remain similar in the United States and worse in the latter. See supra
notes 17, 60, 70 (approving thirteen judges at December recess).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of
Rules: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995).
73. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared,
WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
3749504576172714184601654 [https://perma.cc/A9XH-99XT]; Joe Palazzolo, In Federal
Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746 [https://perma.cc/V8
C3-9K4P]; JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Emergencies (2021)); see infra notes 120–22
(COVID-19 effects); letters cited supra note 2 (case data and pleas to swiftly fill emergencies).
74. Theresa Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 610–17 (2003); John McCain & Jeff Flake, Federal
Judge Diane Humetewa, 40 HUM. RTS. 22 (2015).
75. Jennifer Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Decisionmaking in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759 (2005). But see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati,
Mirya Holman & Eric A. Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011).
76. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS:
FINAL REPORT (1997); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990).
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as judges.77 No persuasive reason supports the failure to improve
diversity. For example, manifold conservative, accomplished individuals of color, women, and LGBTQ people—notably Trump confirmees Bumatay, Lee, Barbara Lagoa, and Rodney Smith, combined with able, moderate Central District Judge Aenlle-Rocha,
plus fine nominees Kim and Leal conjoined with Biden’s six—erode
the idea that ethnic minority, female, and LGBTQ confirmees nullify merit.78 Trump jurists and nominees clearly illustrated merit
and diversity. He needed only to recognize this.
When the Republican chief executive and chamber ignored and
deemphasized critical rules and conventions to swiftly appoint
many conservative, young appellate judges, they eviscerated the
discharge of constitutional responsibilities: (1) presidential duties
to nominate and confirm accomplished trial court jurists and (2)
senatorial responsibilities to comprehensively advise and consent.
Vacancies’ huge quantity and protracted character undermine fulfillment of the judiciary’s duty to speedily, inexpensively, and equitably resolve plentiful cases.79
In sum, Trump promptly appointed myriad extremely conservative, young, talented appeals court jurists. Nonetheless, he and the
chamber omitted and diluted valuable concepts that allowed trial
court openings to attain record heights, which the six emergencies
in the Central District epitomize. Therefore, the last part scrutinizes ways to reduce the court’s abundant emergency vacancies.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Biden must capitalize on effective procedures; former President
Trump actually did invoke a few efficacious practices. One was renaming to Central District openings his first three solid prospects
whose nominations expired in early months of 2019 and 2020, but

77. Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity
of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief [htt
ps://perma.cc/U4XG-XDG2].
78. Tobias, supra note 9, at 909; sources cited supra notes 42–44, infra notes 87, 89.
Kim and Leal, whose nominations expired in January, would need panel hearings and votes
and floor debates and ballots, if Biden renamed them.
79. See sources supra notes 71–73. Nonstop ideological emphasis in selection can make
the bench resemble the political branches and erode trust in it, the Senate, and President.
Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar. 7,
2019); Tonja Jacobi, The New Oral Argument, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161 (2019); Hulse,
supra note 65; Ruiz et al., supra note 21.
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Trump swiftly renewed them.80 This device is efficient; the picks
had intensive committee, FBI, and ABA surveys, which merely required cursory updating, and easily-discovered, complete records,
while the nominees needed to win only panel and floor votes.81 The
idea could be efficacious. The district must now secure all jurists
whom Congress presently authorizes to increase justice. Fairness
mandates that nominees have speedy chamber review, all constituents of presidential-home state legislator trades be honored, and
controversial political machinations and concomitantly senator
party affiliation not dictate judicial resource dissemination.82 Because an overwhelming majority of citizens selected Biden and
Harris as the President and Vice President, the national leaders
must have cultivated, and seemingly did avidly consult, Feinstein
and Padilla regarding the Central District vacancies.83 The country’s leaders and the California senators could have employed with,
and perhaps did apply to, four Trump prospects who lacked confirmations nuanced examinations, which include how excellent and
mainstream they seem, how close in time are elections, plus how
necessary is supplementing the complement of active Central District jurists.84

80. See supra notes 35–39 (renaming nominees in early 2019 and 2020 and confirming
those nominees in late 2020).
81. No Trump district renominees whom he or Obama had first named, who had prior
hearings, needed more. None of the four other Trump Central District nominees who lacked
approval had a hearing. Tobias, supra note 9, at 911; infra notes 83–85 and accompanying
text.
82. See supra notes 25, 35–37, 64 and accompanying text, infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. Trades only work when Presidents and senators respect them. Burgess
Everett & Marianne Levine, Hawley Rattles Republicans as He Derails GOP Judge,
POLITICO (June 12, 2019, 9:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/12/josh-hawleyrepublican-judges-1362687 [https://perma.cc/3EZ3-9LWT]. If Trump, Feinstein, and Harris
entered a trade deal, that deal did expire on January 20, 2021 and did not bind Biden.
83. Harris’s Senate work on judicial selection and her new vice-presidential role mean
she can help, but Harris is extremely busy while Feinstein and Padilla at first rather slowly
suggested picks. Madison Alder, California District Courts in ‘Emergency’ Await Biden
Nominees, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2021, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-we
ek/california-district-courts-in-emergency-await-biden-nominees [https://perma.cc/UY22-F
AP6]; Tal Kopan & Bob Egelko, Federal Court Vacancies Put Pressure on Senators, President
Biden, S.F. CHRON. (June 4, 2021), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Federal-co
urt-vacancies-put-pressure-on-senators-16225699.php [https://perma.cc/NU7B-5XWU]; Andrew Kragie, Long-Waiting Calif. Bench Gets 7th Vacancy in Southern Calif., LAW360 (July
12, 2021, 4:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1402221 [https://perma.cc/4FB2-8GT
B]; Katie Rogers, Harris Meets Macron, Signaling a ‘New Era’ After Sub Snub, Both Say,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/world/europe/france-kamala-harris-mac
ron.html [https://perma.cc/JDF8-QPU6] (Nov. 12, 2021).
84. The four Trump nominees seem well qualified and mainstream and the district need
appears urgent. However, Biden or the California senators disagreed or had different priorities, because none of the Trump nominees has become a Biden Central District nominee.
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Biden ought to analogously contemplate renaming additional
prominent, moderate district court nominees whom President
Obama astutely chose and the committee reported, yet the Republican Senate majority denied appointment throughout 2016.85 This
procedure can expedite approval, because many of these nominees
need to capture only panel and confirmation ballots.86 Trump resent fifteen Obama aspirants whom the Senate confirmed, and
more, exceptionally capable nominees whom Obama proposed,
such as Superior Court Judge Mark Young, a Central District nominee, might accentuate diverse representation or fill federal trial
court openings, which Biden appreciates, because the initial nominees he diligently marshaled for district court vacancies plaguing
Colorado, the District of Columbia, and New Jersey comprised
Obama nominees.87
Another constructive model on which Trump relied and that
Biden deploys, especially with California Ninth Circuit and district
court vacancies, is elevating numbers of preeminent state court jurists and impressive consensus Magistrate Judges whom district
jurists appoint for eight-year terms to district courts and similar
federal district judges to appellate courts. The concept is pragmatic
and fair, because the nominees compile accessible, comprehensive
records and could directly supply much pertinent expertise.88 Illuminating are Biden’s Central District nominees as well as Trump
Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Biden Names Seventh Round
of Judicial Nominees (Sept. 8, 2021); Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y,
President Biden Names Eighth Round of Judicial Nominees (Sept. 30, 2021); Press Release,
White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Biden Names Eleventh Round of Judicial
Nominees (Dec. 15, 2021). But see Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Biden Names Thirteenth Round of Judicial Nominees (Jan. 19, 2022); Press Release,
Eleventh Round, supra (documenting Biden’s renomination of Trump nominees Jennifer
Rearden and Hector Gonzalez to the Eastern District of New York). Senators Feinstein and
Padilla deployed bipartisan merit selection panels that have served effectively. Tobias, supra note 20, at 2256; sources cited supra notes 26, 83.
85. Tobias, supra note 29, at 18. The passage of considerable time since Obama nominated them probably should warrant additional hearings.
86. Id. at 18–19; see supra note 81 (panel, FBI, and ABA analyses only need updating).
87. 167 CONG. REC. S3,971-72 (daily ed. June 8, 2021) (confirming Julien Neals & Regina Rodriguez); id. at S6,634 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2021) (confirming Florence Pan). Judge
Young won 2016 panel approval. Diane Gujarati, an Obama nominee, and Trump appointee,
and twenty-plus other 2016 nominees lacked approval. Tobias, supra note 29, at 21–22. This
technique is pragmatic and fair; the measure facilitates confirmation and nominees have
waited for years.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 631; see supra note 81 (same as to records); Tobias, supra note 9, at 910
(assessing elevation from federal and state courts); supra notes 35–36, 38–39 (analyzing
California nominees’ processes); Press Releases, Seventh, Eighth, & Eleventh Rounds, supra note 84 (documenting deployment of selection for three California Ninth Circuit nominees).
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appointees Superior Court Judges Aenlle-Rocha plus Blumenfeld,
who enjoyed late 2019 hearings, but Republicans stalled the latter
jurists’ confirmation across more than nine months, Kim and Leal
whom the chamber failed to process, and New Jersey Magistrate
Judge Zahid Quraishi.89
Biden should dutifully revive or improve policies which former
President Trump ignored, violated, or downplayed. Biden actively
consults, and should continue avidly consulting, home state politicians; this mechanism facilitates nominations and confirmations
and is blue slips’ chief purpose.90 Useful may have been felicitously
renaming and nominating several mainstream Central District
picks.91 Senators’ assiduous cultivation will not always elicit the
strongest preferences of Democrats and Republicans but the practice can yield more nominations and resolve disputes that could
undercut selection and party cooperation.92 These attributes suggest the possible need to resume consideration of the several accomplished, moderate Central District nominees whom Republicans refused votes and other superb, mainstream prospects, should
the chamber not confirm any Biden nominee, or when Central District openings arise in the future. Biden ought to now counter
Trump’s swift appointment of fifty-plus conservative, able, young
appellate court judges by reviewing ideas to decrease the empty
slots. For instance, Biden can prioritize talented, moderate aspirants who remedy six Central District emergencies 93 and plentiful

89. See supra note 39; 167 CONG. REC. S4,027-29, S4,032 (daily ed. June 10, 2021) (documenting Quraishi as third Biden appointee); Press Releases, Seventh, Eighth & Eleventh
Rounds, supra note 84 (naming diverse federal and state judges; three for Ninth Circuit and
two each for Central and Southern Districts); supra notes 36, 38, 42–44, 85–87 (more Trump
examples).
90. See supra notes 24–26, 35–37, 45–50 (assiduous Trump White House consultation
on Central District, but not Ninth Circuit, vacant posts).
91. See supra notes 26, 35–37. But see supra note 84.
92. See supra notes 24–25, 33–35, 47–48 (assessing judicial appointments disputes between the Trump White House Counsel and Democratic senators from California and other
states).
93. California also had three Ninth Circuit vacancies, which Biden and the Senate
Democrats have recently filled with highly experienced Judges Lucy Koh, Gabriel Sanchez
and Holly Thomas. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2021–2022)); see supra notes 33–34, 63–67.
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related California vacancies;94 this would duly rectify the lack of
ideological balance and blue state nominees and confirmees.95
Biden has committed to diversity’s substantial expansion, as his
initial nominee groups, especially for California, his record-breaking nominations and confirmations, and Biden’s promise to nominate the first Black woman to the Supreme Court illustrate.96 More
representation offers advantages which diverse, fine Ninth Circuit
Judges Lee and Bumatay plus Trump’s well respected Central District ethnic minority nominees aptly typify.97 Biden should continue increasing representation and must convey to the public and
selection participants that he clearly seeks enlarged diversity and
that wider representation has priority. This importuning’s focus
has been White House Counsel staff, the DOJ, the panel, and copious senators. Feinstein and Harris—who carefully emphasized diversity by pursuing and suggesting numerous highly competent
minority individuals—and Padilla ought to keep employing those
activities.98 The White House Counsel should continue interviewing and proffering candidates whom the senators recommend for
the existing and future openings without nominees and persuade
Biden to seriously contemplate forwarding the picks. He may then
name the aspirants while convincing the Senate to powerfully support and quickly confirm them and Trump’s capable, mainstream
nominees who lacked thorough processing. In short, Biden and the
chamber must evaluate near-term ideas which might fill all

94. California currently possesses sixteen, New York five, and New Jersey and Washington two each, district emergencies. All four of the jurisdictions have two Democratic senators. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Emergencies (2022)).
95. Biden should continue relying on home state senator recommendation of able picks.
See supra notes 29–31, 68.
96. Carl Hulse & Michael D. Shear, Biden Names Diverse Nominees for the Federal
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/politics/biden-judges.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/ER3E-9LCN] (June 14, 2021); Press Release, White House, Off. of the Press
Sec’y, President Biden Announces Intent to Nominate 11 Judicial Candidates (Mar. 30,
2021); see supra note 84 (issuing more slates with many California nominees, like the first);
Press Release, Remarks by President Biden on the Retirement of Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer (Jan. 27, 2022) (pledging to nominate the first Black woman to the Supreme
Court).
97. Most of the California vacancies had nominees (six were diverse), but all openings
needed to be filled and only Lee, Bumatay, and Aenlle-Rocha won approval. Striking is no
Black, and one gay, California nominee. See supra notes 44, 74–76; Letter from White House
Counsel Dana Remus to U.S. Senators (Dec. 22, 2020) (urging diverse candidate recommendations).
98. They might want to support Trump nominees Kim and Leal whom the Senate failed
to review. For the senators’ efforts and more ideas to expand diversity, see Carl Tobias,
Appointing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Judges in the Trump Administration, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. ONLINE 11, 20–22 (2018); supra note 83.
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current and future Central District vacancies and temper the nonstop confirmation wars.99
2022 may be past time for adopting numbers of efficacious solutions that could permanently enhance the faltering rules and customs.100 Biden and Congress might alter the current system with a
“bipartisan judiciary” that allows the party without the White
House to submit a percentage of candidates.101 The New York senators first devised this idea.102 Pennsylvania affords a modern example.103 What California recently deployed also can be viewed as
a bipartisan court approach. For instance, Trump confirmed accomplished, young conservatives to four Ninth Circuit openings
which arose from California, and the California senators proposed
most trial-level choices. The nomination measures operated rather
efficaciously, but slowly, yet the appointments practices for numerous Central and significant other California district vacancies performed less well.104
Lawmakers should tether a bipartisan judiciary with legislation
that authorizes comparatively many Central District posts.105 This
action would institute Judicial Conference recommendations for
the Senate and House, which the federal court policymaking arm

99. Examples were Trump’s rare consultation and slow nomination and renomination,
Democrats’ requests for cloture and roll call votes on most nominees, and both parties’ lockstep voting. Tobias, supra note 20, at 2240; see John Gramlich, Federal Judicial Picks Have
Become More Contentious, and Trump’s Are No Exception, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/federal-judicial-picks-have-become-mo
re-contentious-and-trumps-are-no-exception [https://perma.cc/W38J-JVRW]; supra notes
24–25, 37, 45–48, 59, 62, 66–67.
100. For more longer-term suggestions, see Michael Shenkman, Decoupling District from
Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK.
L. REV. 217, 298–311 (2012); Tobias, supra note 20, at 2255–65.
101. Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003);
Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2051
(2016). Democrats might reject this concept, as they won a Senate majority, albeit barely.
They may insist that diversity elements, regular order, and ideological balance, be restored
first.
102. The senator whose party lacked the presidency chose one in three or four possibilities. Tobias, supra note 9, at 915.
103. California, New York, Illinois, and Washington employ similar regimes. Id. at 916;
see supra notes 35–37, 44, 69.
104. In early 2019 Trump renamed three 2018 Central District picks, in autumn sent
ten Central and Southern District nominees, and in spring 2020 nominated two Eastern
District picks. All awaited confirmation until late 2020 when the Senate confirmed one
Southern, and four Central, District judges and two vacancies never had nominees. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 38; see supra notes 35–37, 39, 69, 101 (offering additional
specific ideas on bipartisan courts and trades).
105. U.S. JUDICIAL CONF., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIARY CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 23–24 (2021); Tobias, supra note 59, at 140.
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derives from conservative work and caseload estimates that will
improve resources for jurists.106 These activities should become effective over 2022 or subsequently.107 Yoking bipartisan courts and
fifteen new Central District positions would reap significant benefits. They will supply both parties ample incentives to collaborate;
jurists who provide diverse ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
ideology, and experience; and courts substantial necessary judicial
resources. 2022 passage and installation over subsequent years
would constrict either party’s unfair advantage, but implementation may necessitate caution108 because execution might be complex.109 Republicans have favored analogous strategies in each
house’s Judiciary Committee.110 If Democrats and Republicans do
not agree,111 they may explore a California-specific judgeships regime. For instance, Feinstein and politicians from states with substantial numbers of cases and comparatively few jurists earlier introduced judgeship legislation that might decidedly relieve acute
docket pressures.112
Should those concepts prove unproductive, as Republicans frustrate Democrats’ efforts,113 the nascent majority could apply rather
dramatic remedies. One notion involves the circuit blue slip exception that Democrats will retain until they dutifully restore more
appellate ideological balance.114 Were numerous Republican
106. U.S. JUDICIAL CONF., supra note 105. For comprehensive judgeships bills introduced in the 117th Congress, see S. 2535, 117th Cong. (2021); H.R. 2586, 117th Cong. (2021);
H.R. 4885, 117th Cong. (2021).
107. When both of the parties agree before elections, neither knows which will benefit.
See Tobias, supra note 101.
108. Tobias, supra note 9, at 917–18 (scrutinizing issues that bipartisan courts may create).
109. Congress can effectively address most concerns. Id. at 918. Some customs, including
floor votes on many accomplished, consensus district nominees at recesses, may help restore
regular order. Tobias, supra note 17, at 31; supra note 60.
110. Hearing on New Judgeships Before the H. Courts Judiciary Subcomm. (Feb. 24,
2021); see Nov. 21 Executive Business Meeting, supra note 49 (Chair Graham favoring);
Thomas Berry, The U.S. Needs More Federal Judges, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 9, 2021, 12:39
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-needs-more-federal-judges-11615311539 [https://
perma.cc/C5H4-L SN4]; supra notes 105–06.
111. Slowly renaming three Central District nominees and consulting on, and nominating, fifteen more California picks showed that Republicans undercut Democrats’ national
selection work and many rules and customs. But see supra note 96.
112. S. 2014, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing four new Eastern, three Texas, and two Arizona, district judgeships); S. 3321, 116th Cong. (2020) (five Arizona posts); see S. 2535, 117th
Cong. (2021), supra note 106 (fifteen Central, and four Eastern, posts).
113. See supra note 109; Marimow & Viser, supra note 28 (discussing Republicans’ unnecessary delay of Garland’s Attorney General confirmation).
114. See supra notes 45–48 (discussing circuit exception); supra note 27 (discussing
Biden essentially keeping Republican ABA role); Jeremy Stahl, Republicans Are Abolishing
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politicians to continue displaying recalcitrance, Democrats may
recognize an exception for district slips.115
A related potential solution is trades.116 For example, the California nominee packages’ actual composition indicated that former
President Trump and each California senator proffered some prospects.117 Trump confirmed four appellate court jurists opposed by
the lawmakers, who apparently suggested most trial-level nominees.118 However, “judgetrading” might have deleterious impacts.
The circuit picks whom Trump recommended lacked blue slips, but
the nominees won prompt appointment. The President neglected
to muster nominees for many Central District vacant seats before
autumn 2019 or two more openings ever, tardily renamed the Central District aspirants whom the White House first chose in October 2018 and confirmed no jurist until late 2020.119
Another problem is the coronavirus’ rampant spread around the
Central District which makes pressing endeavors to sharply reduce its vacancies. The pandemic directly exacerbated already
strained tribunal conditions, although prognosticating how the
raging, unpredictable COVID-19 may inflict adverse effects on
court dispositions remains unclear.120 It can generate additional
new cases and stall the existing docket’s resolution, which might
correspondingly promote backlogs, as the delta and omicron variants’ invasions show.121 The Central District has responded with
Judicial Appointments Norms Again, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2019/02/trump-judicial-appointments-mcconnell-democrats-chris-kang.h
tml [https://perma.cc/NGM6-ATQA] (discussing other dramatic ideas).
115. Carl Hulse, Durbin, New Judiciary Chair, Warns Republicans on Blocking Judges,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/us/politics/durbin-senatejudiciary-garland.html [https://perma.cc/4VYW-MFT3] (Durbin alluding to possible district
court blue slip exception); see supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text (noting that Republicans did honor district court blue slips).
116. See supra notes 35–37, 69, 101.
117. Trades, bipartisan courts, and the above paragraph’s ideas overlap. See supra notes
100–14.
118. The four confirmees are very conservative; district nominees were more centrist.
See supra notes 36–37, 68–69.
119. See supra notes 37, 48, 68–69; Tobias, supra note 20, at 2260 (discussing judgetrading). Slowly processing California district nominees effectively meant that the Senate confirmed no nominee until September 2020. See supra note 39.
120. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, CONDUCTING JURY TRIALS DURING THE
PANDEMIC (2020); ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, COURTS BEGIN TO CONSIDER
GUIDELINES FOR REOPENING (2020); ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, COURTS SUSPENDING
JURY TRIALS AS COVID-19 CASES SURGE (2020).
121. Maura Dolan, U.S. Court Upholds COVID-19 Delays in Criminal Trials, Citing Half
a Million Lives Lost, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2021, 7:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/calif
ornia/story/2021-04-23/appeals-court-upholds-pandemic-delays-criminal-trials [https://per
ma.cc/NQS9-WTE4]; see Alan Feuer, Nicole Hong, Benjamin Weiser & Jan Ransom, N.Y.’s
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numerous emergency procedures to address specific complications
that arose.122 Illustrative was postponing certain Speedy Trial Act
deadlines to combat abundant backlogs that the court anticipated
when the virus previously subsided.123 However, the circumstances
are fluid, which may require the Central District to prescribe other
rigorous strictures as conditions actually evolve.
Finally, the confirmation process seemingly necessitated particular adjustments, which included remote hearings that were
meant to counter the virus, which senators adopted over 2020.124
Nevertheless, the pandemic’s 2021 slowing allowed the panel to
conduct live hearings almost every fourteen days that Congress
was in session, while analogous hearings have essentially continued during this year.125 Yet, the precipitous rise of the delta and
Legal Limbo: Pandemic Creates Backlog of 39,200 Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-courts.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/42JN-GGRR]; Greg Land & Amanda Bronstad, Can We Talk? Eyeing COVIDClogged Dockets, Judges Push Civil Cases to Settle, LAW.COM (June 30, 2021, 5:37 PM),
https://www.law.com/2021/07/30/can-we-talk-eyeing-covid-clogged-dockets-judges-push-civ
il-cases-to-settle/ [https://perma.cc/X6EK-4FMJ].
122. Central District of California, COVID-19 Technology Use (2021); Central District of
California, CARES Act Extension (2021); Central District of California, Phased Reopening
(2021); see Luke Money, Rong-Gong Lin II & Howard Blume, California to Lift School Mask
Mandate After March 11, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2022, 3:19 PM), https://www.latimes.com/cal
ifornia/story/2022-02-28/california-to-lift-school-mask-mandate-after-march-11 [https://per
ma.cc/FZR7-425T]. For these and other courts’ tools, see ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS,
COURTS DELIVER JUSTICE VIRTUALLY AMID THE CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK (2020); ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIARY PREPAREDNESS FOR CORONAVIRUS (2020).
123. Letter from Central District of California Chief Judge Virginia Phillips to Ninth
Circuit Chief Judge Sidney Thomas (Apr. 6, 2020); Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit,
Order, In re Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Central District of California (2020); see Central District of California, Order Concerning Phased Reopening of the
Court (2020); Central District of California, Order Concerning the Extension of the Coronavirus Public Emergency Operations Plan (2021).
124. The Senate conducted comparatively few 2020 hearings, but the chamber confirmed
forty-one district judges. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 7 (Confirmations (2020)); Hearing, supra note 39 (discussing how the June California Trump nominee hearing lacked rigor
partly because it was remote); see S. Res. 548, 116th Cong. (2020) (remote voting); Paul
Kane, Caution Dictates How Tradition Bound Senate Adapts to Coronavirus Pandemic,
WASH. POST (May 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/caution-dictateshow-tradition-bound-senate-adapts-to-coronavirus-pandemic/2020/05/08/768c4084-916a-11
ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html [https://perma.cc/W275-62PM]. But see TODD GARVEY,
CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10447, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATION OF REMOTE VOTING IN
CONGRESS (2020).
125. E.g., Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Apr.
28, 2021); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (July
28, 2021); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong (Oct. 6,
2021); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Oct. 20,
2021); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Jan. 12,
2022); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Feb. 1,
2022); Hearing on Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Feb. 16,
2022). The October 20 hearing featured Biden Central District nominees Superior Court
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omicron variants suggests that legislators might carefully attempt
to predict new concerns and deploy finely calibrated analyses,
which balance myriad salient health considerations and the need
for in-person committee hearings and Senate confirmation votes.126
CONCLUSION
Former President Donald Trump and the two Republican chamber majorities during his tenure aggravated the confirmation wars.
The Central District of California acutely exemplified the nationwide conundrum, illuminated by stalled reproposal of most 2019,
and multiple 2018, Trump Central District nominees and consensus prospects’ remarkably dilatory marshaling for the remaining
open slots which lacked nominees. Therefore, President Joseph
Biden and the chamber must immediately alleviate the court’s desperate straits by appointing prominent, centrist nominees to the
six present vacancies. When future openings materialize, or should
the chamber fail to confirm any of the current nominees, Biden and
the Senate ought to consider expeditiously resubmitting and confirming qualified Trump designees on whom Biden, Vice President
Kamala Harris, and California Senators Dianne Feinstein and
Alex Padilla concur or recruiting, scrutinizing, naming, and confirming other able, moderate diverse individuals for the new vacancies or unfilled openings. These ideas promise to curtail America’s worst-case scenario and provide constructive guidance for
bipartisan judicial selection across the country.

Judges Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong and Hernán Vera. The January 12 hearing featured Superior Court Judge Fred Slaughter. The February 1 hearing featured U.S. Magistrate Judge Kenly Kiya Kato and Superior Court Judge Sunshine Suzanne Sykes. The February 16 hearing featured Superior Court Judge Sherilyn Peace Garnett. See supra note 96.
126. Senate rules allow proxy committee votes yet bar floor proxy cloture and confirmation votes, so leaders should treat issues that close votes create in the evenly divided Senate
before members must be absent. See supra note 124; Chris Cameron & Emily Cochrane,
Senator Ben Ray Luján Recovering After Suffering Stroke, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2022), https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/us/politics/ben-ray-lujan-stroke.html [https://perma.cc/GF8C
-PS5U]; see also ALM Staff, Courts Everywhere Are Masking Up and Watching Out Over
Delta Variant Spread, LAW.COM (July 30, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.law.com/nationall
awjournal/2021/07/30/courts-everywhere-are-masking-up-and-watching-out-over-delta-var
iant-spread [https://perma.cc/7FUC-PZ9H].

